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THE MONOPOLY MYTH AND OTHER TALES 
ABOUT THE SUPERIORITY OF LAWYERS 
Leslie C. Levin* 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. legal profession’s so-called monopoly on the practice of law is 
under siege.1  The monopoly depends on barriers to entry such as costly 
legal education, character and fitness inquiries, and other licensing 
requirements that are under sustained attack.2  These barriers not only limit 
entry to the profession, but also are used to justify the profession’s claim of 
technical and moral superiority over nonlawyer providers of legal services.  
At the same time, the legal profession’s privileged status is also eroding, as 
laws that prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by nonlawyers are 
(slowly) being rewritten to permit nonlawyers to provide legal services to 
individuals in a variety of contexts.3  Individuals are also increasingly 
turning to other legal information providers so that they can represent 
themselves both in and out of court. 
In some ways, the surprise is not that the monopoly is eroding, but rather, 
that it has taken so long.  Calls in the United States to permit nonlawyers to 
provide more legal services date back more than thirty-five years.4  In many 
countries, legal services are not provided by a single group of professionals, 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I am grateful to Richard 
Moorhead and Laurel Terry for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. 
 1. In fact, the profession’s conduct can more accurately be likened to a cartel than a 
monopoly. Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly:  A Constitutional and 
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (1981).  
Nevertheless, the term “monopoly” will be used here in its colloquial sense to mean that the 
profession controls most of the market for legal services. 
 2. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); William C. Kidder, 
The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred:  A Critical Analysis of the MBE, Social 
Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547 (2004); Deborah 
L. Rhode, Moral Character As a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985). 
 3. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 4. Ralph Cavanagh & Deborah Rhode, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se 
Divorce:  An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104, 165 (1976); see also Roger Hunter & 
Robert Klonoff, A Dialogue on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 25 VILL. L. REV. 6, 21–
22, 37 (1979); Quintin Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle 
Among Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 55 (1955) (suggesting this approach).  By 1986, 
an American Bar Association report noted, “It can no longer be claimed that lawyers have 
the exclusive possession of the esoteric knowledge required and are therefore the only ones 
able to advise clients on any matter concerning the law.” AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON 
PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE”:  A BLUEPRINT FOR THE 
REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 52 (1986). 
2612 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
but rather by a variety of providers who perform different functions.  One 
frequent line of demarcation has been between legal professionals who 
appear in court and those who provide other legal services.  For example, in 
Japan, there are six different providers of legal services ranging from 
bengoshi, who appear in court, to jun horitsuka (quasi-lawyers) such as 
social insurance labor consultants.5  In the United Kingdom, where 
barristers and some solicitors appear in court, nonlawyers—such as advice 
agencies—provide legal services to individuals outside of court.6 
In the United States, lawyers have struggled to maintain their privileged 
status as providers of legal services.  Although those efforts predated the 
American Revolution, 1870 to 1920 was the seminal period in the legal 
profession’s campaign to prevent the practice of law by nonlawyers.7  Elite 
lawyers formed bar associations and embarked on the professional project, 
that is, the effort by lawyers to attain market monopoly, social status, and 
autonomy.8  The organized bar undertook to raise admission standards by 
requiring formal legal education, bar examinations, and character and 
fitness requirements to signal that lawyers possessed the technical expertise 
and moral fiber to be viewed as a profession and to be entrusted with legal 
work.9  Bar associations also created lawyer disciplinary processes, in part 
to convey to the public that lawyers were trustworthy and capable of self-
regulation.10 
Since then, the bar and the courts have used the rhetoric of public 
protection to justify the claim that only lawyers should be permitted to 
provide legal services to the public.11 They contend that lawyers’ formal 
 
 5. See Kyoko Ishida, The Growing Influences of “Lawyer Substitutes” on Citizens’ 
Access to Legal Services, 27 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 15, 15, 24–25 (2007). 
 6. See Key Facts About the Citizens Advice Service, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, 
http://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/index/aboutus/cab_key_facts.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014); We’re Here To Help You, COUNCIL LICENSED CONVEYANCERS, http://www.clc-
uk.org/consumers.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (describing subject areas in which advice 
or assistance is provided). 
 7. Barlow F. Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law:  Do Good Fences Really 
Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 159, 166–69, 
186. 
 8. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 20, 25 (1989); TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, 
BEYOND MONOPOLY:  LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 67–68 
(1987); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM:  A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS 49–50 (1977); Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in LOOKING BACK AT 
LAW’S CENTURY 287, 294–97 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002). 
 9. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW:  THE LAW MAKERS 
272, 287, 361 (1950); Christensen, supra note 7, at 175–77; Johnstone, supra note 4, at 5. 
 10. HALLIDAY, supra note 8, at 69–72; MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO 
PROFESSIONAL ELITE:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 24–
28 (1988). 
 11. See, e.g., Lowell Bar Ass’n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Mass. 1943) (explaining that 
the justification for excluding nonlawyers from the practice of law was “found, not in the 
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised 
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons”); see also Richmond 
Ass’n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass’n, 189 S.E. 153, 157 (Va. 1937); In re Coop. Law Co., 92 
N.E. 15, 16 (N.Y. 1910); John G. Jackson et al., Report of the Special Committee on 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 57 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 562, 564 (1932); Report of the Standing 
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 66 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 268 (1941). 
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training, moral character, and commitment to professional ideals help 
ensure public protection.12  This can be seen in the 1969 American Bar 
Association’s (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which 
explains that the “prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is 
grounded in the need of the public for integrity and competence of those 
who undertake to render legal services.”13  Unlike nonlawyers, who “are 
not governed as to integrity or legal competence,” lawyers are subject to 
regulation and “also [are] committed to high standards of ethical 
conduct.”14  Similar claims about the technical and moral superiority of 
lawyers continue to the present.15  But as a practical matter, the credentials 
required to become a lawyer (i.e., a graduate law degree and passage of a 
bar examination) “often far exceed the skills demanded.”16  There is also 
scant evidence that lawyers are more effective or trustworthy than 
nonlawyer providers of certain legal services. 
The monopoly is problematic not simply because lawyers are unfairly 
advantaged in the marketplace for legal services.  It contributes to a more 
fundamental problem:  many poor, near-poor, and middle-class individuals 
cannot afford a lawyer.  The scope and consequences of this problem have 
been eloquently described elsewhere.17  But, in essence, to qualify for free 
legal services, an individual must be extremely poor.18  And even among 
those who qualify for free legal services, less than one in five receive the 
legal assistance they need.19  While attorneys annually provide millions of 
 
 12. Christensen, supra note 7, at 188; Jackson et al., supra note 11, at 564. 
 13. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1969).  It further states that 
because of “the inherently complex nature of our legal system, the public can better be 
assured of the requisite responsibility and competence if the practice of law is confined to 
those who are subject to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the 
legal profession.” Id. 
 14. Id. EC 3-3. 
 15. See, e.g., Jean Cotton, Legal Technicians Aren’t the Answer:  The Family Law 
Section’s Executive Committee Weighs In, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 2008, at 30, 32 (stating 
that “[a]llowing inexpert non-lawyers to practice the complex specialty of family law poses a 
risk to the public that cannot be ignored”); Mike France, Bar Chiefs Protect the Guild:  A 
Lobbying Blitz Engulfs an ABA Panel on Non-lawyer Practice, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 
A1, A28. 
 16. ABEL, supra note 8, at 21. 
 17. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel:  An Analysis of Empirical 
Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 52–60 (2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, Summary of 
Testimony:  Task Force To Expand Access to Civil Legal Services in New York, RICHARD 
ZORZA’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE BLOG (Oct. 1, 2012), http://richardzorza.files.wordpress.com/
2012/10/hadfield-testimony-october-2012-final-2.pdf.  
 18. To qualify for Legal Services Corporation–funded services, a family of four 
typically can only earn up to 125 percent of the poverty level, or $29,438. Fact Sheet on the 
Legal Services Corporation, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/about/what-is-lsc (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 19. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA:  THE CURRENT 
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2
009.pdf.  The New York Legal Aid Society was able to help only one out of nine New 
Yorkers who sought its help with civil legal problems. THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS 
TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
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hours of pro bono legal services,20 these efforts have proved inadequate to 
meet the needs of individuals who cannot afford legal representation.  
Indeed, even if every lawyer in the country performed 100 hours of pro 
bono work annually, it would not fill the enormous gap in the need for legal 
services.21  This has led to a significant access to justice problem for 
millions of individuals who cannot afford a lawyer to represent them in 
important matters involving their most basic legal needs.  It has also led to a 
crisis in many courts as they attempt to address the needs of self-
represented litigants who are unfamiliar with legal forms and proceedings.22  
This access to justice problem raises the urgent and obvious question:  why 
should lawyers’ near monopoly of the legal services market continue? 
This Article considers the evidence concerning whether lawyers are 
superior to nonlawyer legal services providers in the results they obtain in 
certain legal matters, and the psychological and other evidence concerning 
whether lawyers are—or are likely to be—more trustworthy.  The 
comparison focuses on whether lawyers are superior to nonlawyer 
representatives who are permitted to provide legal services (e.g., workers’ 
compensation representatives) rather than to illegal providers (e.g., 
notarios).  If lawyers are more effective or more ethical, then the legal 
profession’s monopoly of the legal services market can be justified, at least 
in part, on the grounds that it helps to protect the public.  If lawyers are not 
superior, then it is difficult to justify some of the current limitations on 
nonlawyer practice, especially when so many individuals cannot afford to 
hire a lawyer. 
This Article begins in Part I with a description of the current U.S. legal 
services market, which is dominated by lawyers, but also includes 
nonlawyers who provide legal services in many contexts.  Part II describes 
the empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of nonlawyer legal 
services providers.  The evidence suggests that experienced nonlawyers can 
provide competent legal services in certain contexts and in some cases, can 
seemingly do so as effectively as lawyers.  Part III looks at the question of 
whether lawyers are more trustworthy or “ethical” than nonlawyer 
providers of legal services.  It considers the effectiveness of the 
requirements imposed on lawyers that are thought to increase their 
trustworthiness (e.g., legal education and the character and fitness inquiry) 
 
38 (2010), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-
TaskForceREPORT.pdf. 
 20. PRO BONO INST., 2012 REPORT ON THE LAW FIRM PRO BONO CHALLENGE 1 
(2013), available at http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/2012-Law-Firm-
Challenge-Report.pdf. 
 21. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?  A Comparative Assessment of 
the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 152 
(2010). 
 22. See, e.g., THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., 
supra note 19, at 1; U.S. BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN CRISIS:  
SELF-REPRESENTED PARTIES AND THE COURT 1–3, 8–9 (2011), available at http://ecf-
ciao.cacb.uscourts.gov/Communications/prose/annualreport/2011/ProSeAnnual%20Report2
011.pdf. 
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and also explores whether lawyers’ psychological characteristics are likely 
to make them more trustworthy than nonlawyer legal services providers.  
Part IV discusses the implications of the existing research.  It notes that 
since there is little evidence that lawyers are more effective at providing 
certain legal services or more ethical than qualified nonlawyers, the primary 
justification for the legal profession’s monopoly of the legal services 
market does not hold up to scrutiny.  Instead, the public would be better 
served if more nonlawyer representatives—who were subject to educational 
and licensing requirements—could provide more legal services to the 
public. 
I.  THE MONOPOLY MYTH AND THE U.S. LEGAL SERVICES MARKET 
Lawyers are not the only providers of legal services in the United States.  
Accountants routinely give tax advice, which is based on complex tax law 
and regulations.23  Realtors handle real estate closings in many states.24  
Nonlawyers also represent individuals in many federal agencies.  For 
instance, nonlawyer patent agents admitted to the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office prepare and file complex patent applications.25  
Nonlawyer accredited representatives recognized by the Board of 
Immigration Appeals represent individuals in immigration proceedings.26  
Nonlawyers can represent individuals before the Department of Labor’s 
Wage and Appeals Board.27  Many state agencies also permit nonlawyers to 
represent parties in their proceedings.28 
In most other circumstances, however, nonlawyers who are not working 
under the supervision of lawyers are limited to selling and typing up legal 
forms for self-represented individuals.29  Only a few states allow qualified 
nonlawyers to provide additional assistance when they are operating on 
their own.  Certified legal document preparers in Arizona and legal 
document assistants in California can help prepare legal documents for self-
represented litigants and provide some general information, but they cannot 
give legal advice.30  Immigration consultants in some states can help 
immigrants complete forms, translate documents, and secure supporting 
documents.31  Limited license legal technicians (LLLTs) in Washington can 
 
 23. See Christensen, supra note 7, at 204–05. 
 24. See id. at 197–98, 208, 210–11. 
 25. 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (2013). 
 26. 8 C.F.R. § 1291.2(d) (2014).  Accredited representatives must work for a qualified 
nonprofit organization, but are not required to be supervised by a lawyer. 
 27. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.362(a), 725.363(b). 
 28. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, LEGAL ADVOCACY:  LAWYERS AND NONLAWYERS AT 
WORK 11 (1998); see also infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace:  Online Document Preparation 
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 829–30 (2002). 
 30. See ARIZ. CODE JUD. ADMIN. § 7-208(F)(1) (2007); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 6400(c) (West 2003).  Unlawful detainer assistants can also help individuals complete 
forms in eviction proceedings. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6400(a), (d). 
 31. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22441. 
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help individuals with document preparation and provide legal advice in the 
area of family law.32 
The market for legal services also includes those who provide legal 
services illegally.  This practice is especially prevalent and problematic in 
the area of immigration law.  These nonlawyers, sometimes known as 
notarios or immigration consultants, often live in neighborhoods populated 
by immigrants.33  Notarios can put competitive pressure on lawyers because 
they often charge less than lawyers and promise results that lawyers cannot 
guarantee.34  Notarios are not trained in immigration law—which is 
substantively complex—and their inaccurate advice can have devastating 
consequences, including removal of their clients from the country in cases 
where removal would not have otherwise occurred. 
Finally, the market for legal services has been affected by the steep rise 
in individuals who are engaging in self-representation either because they 
cannot afford a lawyer or because they believe they can handle their legal 
problems on their own.35  Both groups often rely on “do-it-yourself” 
information that can be found in books, in courthouses, and on the internet.  
The number of self-represented litigants in some courts is enormous.  For 
example, 98 percent of tenants in eviction cases in New York State are not 
represented.36  Over 80 percent of divorce cases in some jurisdictions 
involve one or more self-represented parties.37  Many self-represented 
litigants also appear before state agencies in important legal matters, such as 
cases involving denial or termination of subsistence benefits.  The legal 
profession has sought to address this increase in self-represented litigants 
by allowing lawyers to provide limited scope representation (LSR) to 
individuals who are otherwise representing themselves.  In LSR 
arrangements, a lawyer and a client enter into an attorney-client relationship 
in which they agree that the lawyer will only perform specific tasks (e.g., 
review or preparation of forms, legal research, preparation of evidence to 
 
 32. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(F), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.rulesPDF&groupName=ga&setName
=apr&pdf=1. 
 33. See Leslie C. Levin, Immigration Lawyers and the Lying Client, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE:  ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 87, 95 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather 
eds. 2012). 
 34. See id.; Emily A. Unger, Note, Solving Immigration Consultant Fraud Through 
Expanded Federal Accreditation, 29 LAW & INEQ. 425, 425–27 (2011). 
 35. See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented Litigation:  
Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 172–73 
(2003); Bruce D. Sales et al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney 
Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 567 (1993). 
 36. THE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., supra note 19, 
at 1, 17; see also Hannaford-Agor & Mott, supra note 35, at 169 (noting that in Cook 
County, Illinois, neither party was represented by counsel in more than 90 percent of 
eviction cases). 
 37. See, e.g., Lynn Mather & Craig A. McEwen, Client Grievances and Lawyer 
Conduct:  The Challenges of Divorce Practice, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 
63–64; Pro Se Statistics, NAT’L ASS’N CT. MGMT. (June 21, 2006), https://nacmnet.org/sites/
default/files/04Greacen_ProSeStatisticsSummary.pdf. 
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present in court).38  In most jurisdictions, nonlawyers are not permitted to 
perform these same functions for the public. 
II.  LAWYER VERSUS NONLAWYER PERFORMANCE 
The conventional wisdom—and the vast majority of studies—indicate 
that individuals who are represented by lawyers obtain better outcomes in 
civil proceedings than those who are not.39  For example, 21 percent of 
asylum seekers who were represented by counsel obtained relief as 
compared to 1 percent who were not represented by counsel.40  Lawyer 
representation in social security disability appeals increases the represented 
party’s chances of success.41  Individuals represented by counsel in small 
claims courts enjoy better outcomes.42  Represented parties obtain 
significantly better financial results in cases tried before the Tax Court than 
unrepresented parties.43  
Although these findings align with our intuitions about the value of 
counsel, their reliability has been seriously questioned because they are 
mostly based on nonrandom observational studies of outcomes.44  The 
problem with such studies is that a simple comparison of the outcomes in 
cases where a client is represented by a lawyer and where an individual 
self-represents cannot account for other factors that may affect outcomes, 
including factors that affect whether a client will obtain a lawyer.45  For 
instance, the ability to obtain legal representation may depend upon the 
individual’s perseverance or articulateness or other characteristics that may 
also be relevant to case outcomes.46  The ability to obtain counsel may also 
 
 38. See, e.g., Limited Scope Representation, CAL. COURTS:  JUD. BRANCH CAL., 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/1085.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2014). 
 39. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in 
Legal Assistance:  What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 
YALE L.J. 2118, 2175–81 (2012) (citing the studies). 
 40. FELINDA MOTTINO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, MOVING FORWARD:  THE ROLE OF 
LEGAL COUNSEL IN NEW YORK CITY IMMIGRATION COURTS 40 (2000), available at 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/353.409747_MF.pdf#page=41&
zoom=auto,0,73. 
 41. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 114–16. But see William D. Popkin, The Effect of 
Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings—A Study of Three Disability Programs, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1042 (1977) (“Attorneys are not helpful at the Social Security 
reconsideration stage . . . .”). 
 42. See Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing:  Litigation in a Small Claims 
Court, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339, 370 (1976); John Montague Steadman & Richard S. 
Rosenstein, “Small Claims” Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia Municipal Court:  An 
Empirical Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1333 (1973). 
 43. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?  
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2006).  Represented parties, do not, however, seem to obtain 
better outcomes in settled cases. Id. 
 44. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2183–84. 
 45. Id. at 2188–95.  In addition, a “simple” comparison of outcomes is often not possible 
because the range of acceptable outcomes for clients is not binary.  Some clients who 
achieve an acceptable outcome may decide not to continue to pursue the outcome that is 
being measured. 
 46. See id. at 2166–68; Sandefur, supra note 17, at 70. 
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depend upon the strength of the client’s case, which may affect whether a 
private lawyer would take the case on a contingent fee basis or whether a 
legal services lawyer would view the case as worth the investment of office 
resources.47  A straight comparison of outcomes cannot account for these 
factors. 
There have been a few randomized studies in which lawyer 
representation was assigned to one group and compared to a control group 
of unrepresented individuals.  In one such study, tenants represented by 
lawyers in Manhattan Housing Court had significantly better outcomes than 
those who were not represented.48  Likewise, a study comparing the 
outcomes achieved by summary eviction defendants in Massachusetts who 
received traditional legal assistance from legal aid lawyers with outcomes 
achieved by defendants who only attended instructional clinics run by a 
legal aid attorney found that approximately two-thirds of the treated group 
retained possession of their housing compared to one-third of the control 
group.49  However, a randomized study of unemployment appeals claimants 
found that representation by the Harvard Law School clinic had no 
statistically significant effect on the probability that claimants would win 
their appeals as compared to self-represented litigants.50  An older 
randomized study of the impact of legal representation in juvenile courts 
yielded mixed results.51  Thus, the randomized studies provide less robust 
support for the view that individuals obtain better outcomes when 
represented by lawyers. 
Rebecca Sandefur’s analysis of mostly non-randomized studies suggests 
that the procedural complexity of the matters may affect the degree of 
differences in outcomes when individuals are represented by lawyers and 
when they are not.  When comparing outcomes in matters of below average 
procedural complexity (e.g., welfare hearings), those represented by 
 
 47. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Expertise:  Lawyers’ Impact on Civil Trial 
and Hearing Outcomes 8 n.iv (2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 48. Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in 
New York City’s Housing Court:  Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 419, 426–27 (2001).  Only approximately 32 percent of the treatment group (which 
was offered legal representation) had judgments entered against them as compared to 52 
percent of the control group. Id. at 427. 
 49. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance:  A Randomized 
Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
901, 908 (2013).  In cases involving nonpayment of rent or other monetary counterclaims, 
the treated group also obtained substantially more rent relief than the control group. Id. at 
908–09. 
 50. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2124.  The authors note that the win rate for 
the control group was much higher than the win rate in the overall Massachusetts system and 
suggested that the claimants in the control group (who had initiated contact with the Harvard 
Clinic even though they did not ultimately receive legal representation from the clinic) 
possessed personal characteristics making them more likely to win cases. Id. at 2173, 2175. 
 51. In one jurisdiction, legal representation in juvenile court significantly affected 
outcomes while in another it did not. W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN 
DEFENSE OF YOUTH:  A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 66–
68 (1972).  One possible explanation for the disparity was because of differences between 
the judges and procedures in the two jurisdictions. Id. at 155–58. 
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attorneys were, on average, 40 percent more likely to win than those who 
were self-represented.52  In fields of average procedural complexity in trial 
courts, lawyer-represented individuals were, on average, 6.5 times more 
likely to win than self-represented individuals.53  Lawyers’ potential impact 
is also greater in adversarial fora (trial courts) than in simplified fora (e.g., 
small claims courts).54  Sandefur suggests that part of the reason individuals 
do better when represented by lawyers may be because lawyers help 
claimants navigate procedural complexity.55  The presence of lawyers may 
also serve as an endorsement of a case’s merits and may encourage the 
tribunal to follow the law and its own rules.56 
There do not appear to be randomized studies involving nonlawyer 
representatives.57  While non-randomized studies of case outcomes raise the 
same methodological concerns described above,58 it is still instructive to 
consider the studies that explore whether lawyers obtain better outcomes 
than nonlawyer representatives.  Taken together, the studies suggest there is 
little evidence to support the legal profession’s claims of superiority as 
compared to nonlawyer representatives in certain legal contexts.59 
In the most systematic of the U.S. studies,60 Herbert Kritzer looked at 
lawyer and nonlawyer representation in four types of civil proceedings in an 
effort to answer the question:  “Does it really matter whether an advocate 
 
 52. Sandefur, supra note 17, at 73. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Sandefur, supra note 47, at 26. 
 55. Sandefur, supra note 17, at 74; Sandefur, supra note 47, at 28. 
 56. See Sandefur, supra note 47, at 4, 29–30. 
 57. The closest is the Harvard study involving law clinic students.  But the investigators 
expressly discount the possibility that the failure to find a difference there between those 
who were represented and those who were not was due to the fact that the students were not 
lawyers.  They point to the quality of the lawyer supervision and the high quality of 
representation provided. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 39, at 2172. 
 58. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.  For example, lawyers may screen 
out weak cases because they work on a contingent fee basis.  Thus, lawyers’ success rate 
may be higher than the success rates of nonlawyers, who do not work on a contingent fee 
basis. See KRITZER, supra note 28, at 116. 
 59. See, e.g., infra notes 62–64, 70, 72 and accompanying text; see also Richard 
Moorhead, Precarious Professionalism:  Empirical and Behavioural Perspectives on 
Lawyers, at 9–10 (March 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407370. But see Sandefur, supra note 47, at 26–27 
(reporting in a meta-analysis of several studies that individuals represented by lawyers were 
more likely to prevail than if they were represented by nonlawyer advocates). 
 60. Earlier studies also explored these issues.  A study of the Social Security hearing 
system, which permits lay representation, found that “the contribution of counsel to the 
accuracy, consistency, or timeliness of the decision process [was] indeterminable.  
Everything hinges on the ability and attention of the representative.” JERRY L. MASHAW ET 
AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS:  A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION HEARING SYSTEM, at xxiv (1978).  Individuals who were represented by 
counsel before the Board of Veterans Appeals had a slightly higher ultimate success rate, as 
compared to the success rate when service organizations represented individuals, and when 
individuals were self-represented, but it was not clear whether these differences were 
statistically significant. 1 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SPECIAL LEGAL PROBLEMS AND PROBLEMS OF 
ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES summary app., at A-12 to A-13 (1978).  Lawyers who did not 
specialize “were not useful” and were “irrelevant.” Id. at A-18 to A-19. 
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has formal legal training?”61  He found that in unemployment compensation 
appeals, experienced nonlawyer advocates could effectively represent 
parties and that legal training did not ensure that an advocate would be 
effective if the advocate was not familiar with the regulations or procedures 
governing unemployment compensation appeals.62  In the social security 
disability appeals context, attorneys were slightly more successful than 
nonattorney representatives, probably because of the work of a small group 
of highly effective attorneys who specialized in social security cases.63  In 
the state labor grievance arbitration context, there were no statistically 
significant differences between the outcomes when there was lawyer rather 
than nonlawyer representation.64  In the tax appeals context, nonlawyer 
representatives often lacked the procedural expertise to be as effective as 
lawyers.65 
Kritzer concluded that the “presence or absence of formal legal training 
is less important than substantial experience with the setting.”66  Three 
types of expertise were important:  knowledge about the substantive law, an 
understanding of the procedures, and familiarity with the regular players in 
the process.67  Those who had experience with the forum were able to 
obtain better results, because they knew the decision makers and were able 
to tailor their presentations effectively.68 
Similar findings about nonlawyer representatives have emerged from the 
United Kingdom.  A 1989 observational study found that in four 
administrative tribunals (social security appeals, immigration hearings, 
mental health review, and industrial tribunals), “a representative 
significantly and independently increases the probability that appellants and 
applicants will succeed with their case at a tribunal hearing.”69  Specialist 
lay representation was as effective as representation by lawyers, except in 
industrial tribunals.70  In all tribunals, specialization and expertise were 
viewed as the most important qualifications for good representation and 
those who specialized provided the greatest assistance to their clients.71 
More recently, Moorhead, Paterson, and Sherr found, based on a review 
of case files, the use of “model clients,” and client surveys, that nonlawyers 
performed to higher standards than lawyers when providing representation 
 
 61. KRITZER, supra note 28, at 14. 
 62. Id. at 77. 
 63. Id. at 118–19, 143. 
 64. Id. at 171.  In this context, an experienced nonlawyer had a high likelihood of 
success against an inexperienced lawyer, and “[s]pecialist nonlawyers and specialist lawyers 
appeared to be better advocates than non-specialist lawyers.” Id. at 185. 
 65. Id. at 109. 
 66. Id. at 201. 
 67. Id. at 203. 
 68. Id. at 196. 
 69. HAZEL GENN & YVETTE GENN, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION AT 
TRIBUNALS:  REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 243 (1989). 
 70. See id. at 247.  The analysis of the effects of representation in the industrial tribunals 
was “fraught with difficulty” because of the high rate of prehearing settlements and the need 
to consider both the applicant’s and the respondent’s representation. Id. at 87. 
 71. Id. at 245–47. 
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in the areas of welfare benefits work, housing, and debt matters.72  The 
likelihood of a solicitor getting a positive financial result in a welfare 
benefit case was about a quarter of the likelihood of a nonlawyer agency, 
and in employment cases, solicitors were about half as likely to get a 
positive result as nonlawyer representatives.73  Peer review of files found 
that where cases were handled by a solicitor’s firm rather than a nonlawyer 
agency, the likelihood of a case being assessed as being handled below the 
threshold of competency increased.74  Client surveys indicated that clients 
were somewhat more satisfied with nonlawyer representatives, although 
nonlawyers did less well with handling the initial client appointment.75  
Overall, nonlawyers had “clients with slightly higher satisfaction ratings 
and got significantly better results, and their work on cases was more likely 
to be graded at higher levels of quality by experienced practitioners 
working in their field.”76  Like some of the other studies, the findings 
suggest that “specialization is usually more important than legal 
qualifications in determining the quality of advocacy.”77 
III.  THE ETHICAL SUPERIORITY OF LAWYERS? 
As noted, the bar also justifies its monopoly of the legal services market 
with the argument that lawyers are more trustworthy (i.e., ethical) than 
nonlawyers.  Lawyers bolster their claim with references to their legal 
training, their ethical code, the character and fitness inquiry, the lawyer 
discipline system, and the threat of malpractice liability.78  It is not clear, 
however, that these factors contribute significantly to the trustworthiness of 
lawyers.  For example, studies have not demonstrated that legal education 
positively affects the moral development of lawyers.79  Law students learn 
 
 72. Richard Moorhead et al., Contesting Professionalism:  Legal Aid and Nonlawyers in 
England and Wales, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 765, 788–89, 795 (2003).  For a description of 
this and other studies showing that solicitor performance was not superior to nonsolicitor 
performance, see Moorhead, supra note 59, at 9–10. 
 73. In the housing context, the situation is more mixed. Id. at 787. 
 74. Id. at 788. 
 75. Id. at 784–86, 791, 794. 
 76. Id. at 789. 
 77. Id. at 796; see also GENN & GENN, supra note 69, at 245–46. 
 78. E.g., AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN 
LAW-RELATED SITUATIONS:  A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 163–64 (1995); Report of 
the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 11, at 268; France, 
supra note 15. 
 79. Maury Landsman & Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students Across 
Three Years:  Influences of Gender, Political Ideology and Interest in Altruistic Law 
Practice, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 891, 914 (2004) (reporting that assessments of law students’ 
moral judgments using the Defining Issues Test revealed that scores did not improve while 
students were in law school); see also Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral 
Development of the Law Student:  Theory and Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
306, 354, 355 (1981) (showing no statistically significant change in moral reasoning of 
students during law school). But see Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development 
Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 527 (1995) (reporting that 
experientially taught professional responsibility courses significantly influenced students’ 
moral reasoning). 
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about the Rules of Professional Conduct in law school—including the rules 
concerning competence, confidentiality, and conflicts—but it is not known 
how much this experience affects their ethical decisions in practice.80 
This is not to say that the factors that the legal profession point to as 
evidence of superior trustworthiness have no influence on lawyers’ conduct, 
but rather that the significance of these factors is unproven—and may be 
overstated.  For example, the ambiguity of lawyers’ professional rules 
permit lawyers to interpret their responsibilities in self-interested ways.81  
Moreover, it is unclear whether lawyers’ rules of professional conduct 
affect behavior any more than rules governing the conduct of any other 
licensed profession.  Likewise, the character and fitness inquiry, which is 
intended to screen out those who lack the moral character to practice law, 
has not been shown to do so.  Very few bar applicants are denied admission 
on character and fitness grounds and the information elicited during that 
process (e.g., prior convictions, substance abuse) does not strongly predict 
who will later be disciplined.82  Concerns about discipline sanctions shape 
lawyer conduct in certain practice contexts,83 as does the threat of civil 
liability, but it is not clear that they do so any more than in other regulated 
industries (e.g., the securities industry).  In other words, if nonlawyer 
providers of legal services had a code of conduct and faced the threat of 
sanctions or civil liability, their ethical behavior might be affected with 
equal force. 
As an empirical matter, the bar’s claim that lawyers are more trustworthy 
than nonlawyer legal services providers is exceedingly difficult to test.  
Much misconduct by lawyers and nonlawyer providers is undetected or 
unreported, so the true extent is unknown.  Even a comparison of 
complaints against lawyers and nonlawyers is difficult as the complaints 
can be made in different fora,84 and the ease of filing a complaint against 
lawyers and nonlawyer providers of legal services differs considerably.85  
Complaint information and sanctions involving lawyers are often not 
 
 80. See Leslie C. Levin, The Ethical World of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 309, 370 (2004) (reporting on the “disconnect” between the rules and the 
realities of practice); see also Moorhead, supra note 59, at 34 (noting the lack of evidence of 
the efficacy of prequalification ethical training in the United Kingdom). 
 81. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 82. Leslie C. Levin et al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s Character and 
Fitness Inquiry, 40 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 2–3) (on file 
with author).  In Connecticut, for example, only one to two applicants a year are denied 
admission. Id. (manuscript at 4 n.3).  While some additional number of potential applicants 
may be deterred from applying, that number is not known.  Nor is it known whether those 
who were deterred would have been untrustworthy lawyers. Id. (manuscript at 5 n.4). 
 83. See Levin, supra note 33, at 103–04. 
 84. Complaints against lawyers are made to lawyer discipline authorities, to courts, to 
administrative agencies, and to prosecutors.  Complaints against nonlawyer providers are 
made to lawyer discipline authorities, to consumer protection and other administrative 
agencies, to state attorneys general, and to prosecutors. 
 85. State discipline systems have made significant strides in publicizing how to file a 
complaint against a lawyer. Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer 
Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 20–21 (2007).  It is much more difficult for the 
public to determine how and where to complain about nonlawyer legal services providers. 
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publicly available;86 it is even harder to find records of complaints or 
discipline involving nonlawyer providers.87  Even when lawyers and 
nonlawyer representatives operate in the same forum, comparisons are 
difficult because the decisionmaker may apply different standards or 
otherwise handle complaints against lawyers and nonlawyers differently.88 
While direct comparisons of misconduct by lawyers and nonlawyer legal 
services providers are not available, it is useful to consider whether there is 
something about the personalities or psychological attributes of lawyers that 
might make them more likely to behave in a trustworthy fashion than 
others.  As it turns out, lawyers’ decisionmaking processes have not been 
shown to be different than the decisionmaking processes of other 
individuals.  Lawyers do differ, however, from the general public in their 
personality traits and mental health in ways that may affect their ethical 
behavior. 
A.  Psychological Characteristics of Law Students and Lawyers 
The choice of profession is associated with specific personality types.89  
On the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which assesses personality 
types, law students appear to prefer “thinking” (e.g., looking at the logical 
consequences of a choice or action) over “feeling” (e.g., making decisions 
based on values and what is important to them and to others).90  They are 
also more likely to prefer “judging” (e.g., living in a planned, orderly way) 
over “perceiving” (e.g., living in a flexible, spontaneous way).91 
Law students may be somewhat more ethical than other graduate 
students—but they are not that ethical.  A small study that tested the moral 
judgment of law students found that incoming first-year law students scored 
higher than most other first-year graduate students.92  Unfortunately, their 
judgment does not appear to improve during law school.93  Moreover, 45 
percent of law students admitted to cheating in law school in the previous 
year.94  While this is less than the 56 percent of graduate business students 
 
 86. See id. at 19–20. 
 87. See, e.g., Isabel Medina, The Challenges of Facilitating Effective Legal Defense in 
Deportation Proceedings:  Allowing Nonlawyer Practice of Law Through Accredited 
Representatives in Removals, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 459, 471 (2012). 
 88. See, e.g., David Hricik, Patent Agents:  The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 261, 267–68 (2007). 
 89. Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing 
Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979, 981, 1027 (2002); Gidi Rubinstein & 
Sally Strul, The Five Factor Model (FFM) Among Four Groups of Male and Female 
Professionals, 41 J. RES. ON PERSONALITY 931, 932 (2007). 
 90. Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 460, 465 (1967); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, 
First Year Law Students and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 91–92 (1995). 
 91. Randall, supra note 90, at 96. 
 92. Landsman & McNeel, supra note 79, at 904. 
 93. Id. at 914. 
 94. Leigh Jones, Cheating 2.0:  Law Schools Confront New Twists on a Venerable 
Temptation, NAT’L L.J., May 25, 2009, at 1.  It should be noted that the response rate was 13 
percent, which is low. Donald L. McCabe et al., Academic Dishonesty in Graduate Business 
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and the 54 percent of engineering students who reported cheating,95 the 
lower rate reported by law students may have been due to concerns about 
the consequences for bar admission if they were caught.96  This amount of 
cheating in law school is troubling, as there appears to be a relationship 
between academic cheating and dishonest behaviors in the workplace.97 
Personality testing of lawyers is consistent with the findings about law 
students.  MBTI preferences for lawyers are significantly different from 
those found in the general population.98  Like law students, lawyers tend to 
be “thinking” and “judging” types rather than “feeling” and “perceiving” 
types.99  They prefer introversion to extraversion and are less 
interpersonally oriented,100 which is likely to affect the quality of 
communication between lawyers and clients.101  This may account for why 
clients sometimes express greater satisfaction with assistance from lay 
specialists than from lawyers.102 
Lawyers also appear to be less resilient than other people.103  Resilience 
is characterized as the ability to bounce back quickly from criticism, 
rejection, or setbacks by flexible adaptation to changing demands or 
stressful experiences.104  Resilient individuals have optimistic approaches 
to life, higher self-worth, better coping skills, and positive emotions even in 
 
Programs:  Prevalence, Causes and Proposed Action, 5 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING EDUC. 
294, 297 (2006). 
 95. Emily Sachar, MBA Students Cheat More Than Other Grad Students, Study Finds, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 25, 2006), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive
&sid=aw7s9m0BmcBo; see also McCabe et al., supra note 94, at 299. 
 96. See Lucia Graves, Which Types of Students Cheat Most?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/10/03/which-types-
of-students-cheat-most. 
 97. Sarath Nonis & Cathy Owens Swift, An Examination of the Relationship Between 
Academic Dishonesty and Workplace Dishonesty:  A Multicampus Investigation, 77 J. BUS. 
EDUC. 69, 75 (2001); Randi L. Sims, The Relationship Between Academic Dishonesty and 
Unethical Business Practices, 68 J. BUS. EDUC. 207, 209–10 (1993). 
 98. Richard, supra note 89, at 1015–17, 1029. 
 99. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself:  A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney 
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 1392–93 (1997); Richard, 
supra note 89, at 1029. 
 100. Daicoff, supra note 99, at 1394; Richard, supra note 89, at 1017, 1029; Larry 
Richard & Lisa Roher, A Breed Apart?  How Personality Characteristics Influence Who 
Becomes a Lawyer—and How Far They Rise, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2011, at 43–44. 
 101. Richard, supra note 89, at 1042. 
 102. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON LEGAL 
TECHNICIANS 14 (1990) (noting that while 64 percent of those who received assistance from 
lawyers were happy overall with the service, 76 percent of those who received nonlawyer 
assistance were happy with the service); Moorhead et al., supra note 72, at 784 (noting 
somewhat higher satisfaction among nonlawyers’ clients than solicitors’ clients). 
 103. The average for this trait among the public is the fiftieth percentile; among lawyers, 
the average is the thirtieth percentile. Many lawyers score below 10 percent. LARRY 
RICHARD, HERDING CATS:  THE LAWYER PERSONALITY REVEALED 7, available at 
http://www.managingpartnerforum.org/tasks/sites/mpf/assets/image/MPF%20-%20Herding
%20Cats%20-%20Richard%20-%203-5-121.pdf. 
 104. Dmitry M. Davydov et al., Resilience and Mental Health, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 
REV. 479, 481 (2010); Michele M. Tugade & Barbara L. Frederickson, Resilient Individuals 
Use Positive Emotions To Bounce Back from Negative Emotional Experiences, 86 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 320 (2004). 
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the face of stress;105 low-resilience individuals score high on emotional 
instability and low on agreeableness and openness to experience.106  People 
who are low on resilience tend to be defensive and resistant to feedback.107  
They may also be predisposed toward anxiety and chronic dysphoria.108 
Low resilience may be a predictor of depressive symptoms109 and may 
help explain why lawyers suffer from elevated levels of depression and 
psychological disorders beyond that found in the nonlawyer population.110  
Individuals with low resilience may find it difficult to cope with law school 
and the pressures of practice.111  A study in the 1980s found the prevalence 
of major depressive disorders in U.S. lawyers was 10 percent, which was 
one of the highest overall prevalence rates among all occupations and 
substantially higher than the 3 to 5 percent found among the general 
population.112  Two other studies revealed that more than 20 percent of the 
lawyers surveyed manifested significant symptoms of depression and that 
they did so at a rate far greater than would be expected in the general 
population.113  In one of those studies, many male lawyers also reported 
interpersonal sensitivity (30.2 percent),114 anxiety (27.8 percent), social 
alienation and isolation (24.6 percent), paranoid ideation (13.2 percent), and 
a Global Severity Index (18.3 percent) at a significantly higher rate than the 
 
 105. Maureen Davey et al., Resilience Processes in Adolescents:  Personality Profiles, 
Self-Worth, and Coping, 18 J. ADOLESCENT RES. 347, 348, 358 (2003); Tugade & 
Frederickson, supra note 104, at 320. 
 106. See Davey et al., supra note 105, at 354–55.  Low resilience also has a relationship 
to neuroticism, which encompasses a proneness to negative emotions and difficulty coping. 
L. Campbell Sills et al., Relationship of Resilience to Personality, Coping, and Psychiatric 
Symptoms in Young Adults, 44 BEHAV. & RES. THERAPY 585, 593 (2006). 
 107. See RICHARD, supra note 103, at 7. 
 108. Jack Block & Adam M. Kremen, IQ and Ego-Resiliency:  Conceptual and Empirical 
Connections and Separateness, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 349, 351 (1996). 
 109. Odin Hjemdal et al., Resilience As a Predictor of Depressive Symptoms:  A 
Correlational Study with Young Adolescents, 12 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 
91, 99 (2007). 
 110. See Connie J.A. Beck et al., Lawyer Distress:  Alcohol-Related Problems and Other 
Psychological Concerns Among a Sample of Practicing Lawyers, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 1 
(1995).  This is also true in other countries. See, e.g., NORM KELK ET AL., COURTING THE 
BLUES:  ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEPRESSION IN AUSTRALIAN LAW STUDENTS AND LEGAL 
PRACTITIONERS 37 (2009), available at http://www.cald.asn.au/docs/Law%20Report%
20Website%20version%204%20May%2009.pdf. 
 111. Prior to entering law school, law students experience approximately the same levels 
of distress and depression as the normal population. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Role 
of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students, 1986 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 225, 246; see also Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S. Krieger, Does Legal 
Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students?  Evaluating Changes in Motivation, 
Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 261, 267, 270 (2004) (reporting that on the 
first day of law school students evidenced higher positive affect and life satisfaction than 
undergraduates).  Shortly after beginning law school, students’ psychological symptoms 
emerged, and remained elevated beyond the level found in the normal population even after 
graduation. See, e.g., Beck et al., supra note 110, at 45; Benjamin et al., supra, at 240, 248. 
 112. William W. Eaton et al., Occupations and the Prevalence of Major Depressive 
Disorder, 32 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 1079, 1081 (1990). 
 113. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 18. 
 114. “Interpersonal sensitivity” included feelings of inferiority to others, self-
consciousness, and easily hurt feelings. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 54–55. 
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average adult population.115  The study’s authors noted, “Although the data 
are not sufficient to suggest that psychological distress has detrimentally 
affected the lawyers’ ability to practice competently, the warning signs are 
present.”116 
Lawyers may also abuse alcohol more than the general population of 
employed workers.117  One study in the 1980s found that 18 percent of 
Washington State lawyers may have alcohol-related problems.118  The 
actual level of alcohol abuse and addiction is not clear.119  Discipline 
authorities report a high rate of depression and substance abuse among 
lawyers who are disciplined.120  The evidence that there is a higher rate of 
depression—and possibly alcohol problems—among lawyers than in the 
general population suggests lawyers may be less trustworthy than they 
claim. 
B.  Lawyers, Cognitive Biases, and Ethical Decisionmaking 
Lawyers are not immune from the cognitive biases that affect all human 
judgment.  This may seem surprising, in light of evidence that most lawyers 
are “thinkers” on the MBTI and often pride themselves on being “rational” 
and objective.  Yet much ethical decisionmaking appears to be 
nonconscious and intuitive rather than conscious and deliberate.121  
Moreover, even when people consciously engage in decisionmaking, they 
are not objective information processors.122  The brightest, most competent 
 
 115. Id. at 23–24.  The Global Severity Index measures the intensity of the psychological 
distress being experienced. Id. at 15.  Women lawyers also reported elevated levels on these 
measures, but not as high as men. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. 
 117. G. Andrew H. Benjamin et al., The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, and 
Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers, 13 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 233, 235, 241 
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 118. Id. at 241. 
 119. The Washington study relies on the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test-Revised 
score, which indicates that an alcohol problem is likely. Id. at 241.  This is not the same as 
finding that there was alcoholism or alcohol dependency. Beck et al., supra note 110, at 50.  
Another study conducted during the same period indicated that the rate of alcohol abuse or 
dependence among lawyers was 9.42 percent, which was slightly less than the prevalence in 
the general labor force. Frederick S. Stinson et al., Prevalence of DSM-III-R Alcohol Abuse 
and/or Dependence Among Selected Occupations, 16 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD 165, 
167–68 (1992). 
 120. See Rick B. Allan, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers:  Are We Ready To 
Address the Denial?, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265, 268 (1997); Cynthia L. Spanhel, The 
Impact of Impaired Attorneys on the Texas Grievance Process, 52 TEX. B.J. 312, 312 
(1989); Stephen Anderson, New Data Link Mental Impairment with Discipline, ISBA B. 
NEWS, March 1, 1994, at 2. 
 121. See LINDA KLEBE TREVIÑO & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 160–61 (2003); Fiery Cushman et al., The Role of Conscious Reasoning and 
Intuition in Moral Judgment:  Testing Three Principles of Harm, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1082, 
1087–88 (2006); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail:  A Social 
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 822 (2001). 
 122. George Loewenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics:  Skewed 
Trade-Offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT:  BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO 
BUSINESS ETHICS 214, 221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). 
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people—including lawyers—are susceptible to cognitive biases even as 
they continue to believe in their own objectivity.123  When lawyers’ 
personal characteristics are coupled with the demands of law practice and 
certain cognitive biases, they may become susceptible to poor ethical 
decisionmaking.124 
Most individuals see themselves as better than average in many respects:  
for example, more objective, more competent, and more ethical.125  It is not 
difficult to imagine how lawyers may be especially susceptible to these self-
serving biases.  They are trained to approach problems in an objective, 
competent, and ethical manner and pride themselves on doing so.  
Cognitive biases also cause individuals to see themselves as more deserving 
than others, and to resolve ambiguity and questions about fairness in self-
interested ways.126  This can be especially problematic for lawyers, who 
constantly confront factual and legal ambiguity, but receive only limited 
assistance from the rules of professional conduct in resolving ambiguity 
because the rules themselves are often ambiguous.127 
The overconfidence bias facilitates many of these other biases by making 
people more confident in their judgments than is warranted by objective 
facts.128  Overconfidence has been found in a variety of experts, including 
lawyers, and especially where the issues are personally relevant.129  
Overconfidence causes people to think that they are making good choices 
and that they do not need to reconsider how to approach decisions they have 
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previously made.130  Once judgments are made, confirmation bias causes 
people to see confirming evidence of their decisions as more relevant than 
evidence that disconfirms the correctness of their choices.131  After they 
have committed to a course of action, they prefer to act in ways that are 
consistent with past conduct, in part because they do not wish to consider—
or admit to others—that they have made a mistake.132  These psychological 
processes (and others) can give rise to ethical blind spots that interfere with 
the ability to resolve ethical issues appropriately. 
Lawyers are as susceptible to these ethical blind spots as anyone else.133  
In fact, the conditions of law practice may exacerbate the likelihood of 
certain biased decisionmaking.  People rely on intuitive reasoning—which 
is often skewed by cognitive biases—when they are busy and rushed.134  
Unethical decisions are more common when the decisionmaker is under 
time pressure, sleep deprived, or cognitively taxed.135  These are the 
conditions under which much of law practice occurs. 
Moreover, many lawyers have low resilience and rate high on 
interpersonal sensitivity,136 which may make them in particular need of ego 
protection.  The ego has been compared to a totalitarian state “in which 
unflattering or undesirable facts are suppressed in the interest of self-
enhancement.”137  This occurs because people need to see themselves as 
good and reasonable, and they subconsciously distort evidence to bolster or 
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maintain a positive self-image.138  The maintenance of self-esteem has been 
described “as a fundamental human impulse.”139 
As a result, once lawyers make a decision, they may be particularly 
resistant to rethinking that decision, even when faced with evidence that 
they may have made a mistake.  People who are low on resilience “tend to 
be defensive, resist taking in feedback, and can be hypersensitive to 
criticism.”140  Thus, once lawyers have committed to a course of action, 
they may find it very difficult to change it, not only because of 
overconfidence and the confirmation bias, but because their need to protect 
their egos will not allow it.  Most people want to believe they have made 
good decisions and to view themselves as consistent and competent 
decisionmakers.141  Lawyers pride themselves on being especially good in 
this regard.  Evidence to the contrary may be discounted because of the 
significant ego threat it presents. 
It is important to note that there is no evidence that lawyers are more 
likely than nonlawyers to make unethical decisions because of these 
cognitive biases.  Nor is there evidence that their low resilience, higher rates 
of depression, or other personal characteristics make them less ethical than 
other individuals.  At the same time, there is scant evidence that their 
personalities or other psychological characteristics make them superior in 
their ethical decisions to nonlawyer representatives.  On the contrary, 
lawyers may be especially susceptible to cognitive biases that can adversely 
affect their ethical judgments. 
IV.  MOVING BEYOND THE MONOPOLY 
The legal profession’s claims about lawyers’ superiority rest largely on 
rhetoric rather than on empirical evidence.  They also rely on extreme 
comparisons.  No one seriously questions that an experienced securities 
litigator is more competent to handle a federal securities lawsuit than an 
untrained lay representative.  The proper comparison is between the legal 
outcomes achieved by lawyers and nonlawyer representatives (NLRs)—
such as patent agents or workers’ compensation representatives—who are 
trained and licensed to work in a particular area of practice.  Likewise, the 
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correct comparison is not between the trustworthiness of lawyers and 
unregulated nonlawyers who are operating illegally.  The comparison 
should be between lawyers and NLRs who are subject to discipline if they 
engage in misconduct.  While it is not yet possible to prove, based on the 
existing studies, that NLRs are as effective or trustworthy as lawyers 
working in certain fields, it is also not possible to prove the opposite.  The 
evidence that does exist in the United States and in countries where NLRs 
provide substantial legal assistance does not indicate that the public is 
significantly harmed as a result.142 
In the absence of such evidence, the refusal to permit NLRs to provide 
more legal services in the United States is hard to justify when low-income 
individuals have so much unmet need for legal assistance.143  Legal 
document preparers cannot fill this need because they cannot supply the 
advice and representation that many need in connection with their important 
legal problems.144  Arizona and California permit approved legal document 
preparers who meet certain requirements to provide individuals with 
general legal information and assist with filing and service of papers, but 
they, too, cannot give legal advice.145  The expanded licensing of NLRs in a 
variety of legal contexts is needed to increase access to justice for many 
Americans. 
The Washington Supreme Court has recently taken a step in this 
direction, permitting nonlawyer limited license legal technicians to advise 
clients in the area of family law.146  LLLTs will be permitted, inter alia, to 
explain the relevancy of facts to clients, to inform clients about applicable 
procedures and documents that must be filed, and to inform clients of the 
anticipated course of the legal proceeding.147  LLLTs must have 3,000 
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hours of prior law-related experience supervised by a lawyer and either 
have an associate’s degree or forty-five hours of paralegal education.148  
They must also receive fifteen hours of instruction in the area of family law, 
pass an examination, demonstrate good moral character, and engage in 
continuing legal education.149  LLLTs will be held to the ethical standards 
of the LLLT Rules of Professional Conduct, subject to discipline for 
misconduct, held to the same standard of care as a lawyer, and required to 
carry malpractice insurance or to demonstrate their ability to respond to 
damage claims.150 
In certain respects, Washington’s LLLT requirements are more onerous 
than the requirements to become a lawyer.  Unlike LLLTs, lawyers are not 
required to have any practice experience before representing clients on their 
own.  Lawyers are not required to take any courses in family law before 
practicing in that area.  Lawyers are not required to carry malpractice 
insurance (except in Oregon), or prove that they have the financial ability to 
respond to damages claims.151  Indeed, the only requirements to become a 
lawyer that are more demanding than the LLLT requirements are the legal 
education requirement and the more extensive bar examination requirement. 
In light of this, it is hard to argue that Washington’s approach is 
insufficiently protective of the public, especially given the limited legal 
assistance that LLLTs can provide.  LLLTs cannot write letters for clients 
(unless reviewed by a lawyer), negotiate on behalf of clients, or appear in 
courts or before other tribunals.152  If LLLTs are more extensively trained 
in a single field and as highly regulated as lawyers, it is not clear why they 
should not be permitted to do more for clients—including negotiate for 
clients and appear in certain courts.  In other words, it is not clear why they 
should not be true nonlawyer representatives. 
The idea that NLRs should be permitted to act as representatives for 
individuals in certain matters—including in administrative proceedings and 
in some courts—finds support in the United States, where approved 
nonlawyers represent individuals before certain federal and state agencies, 
and in other countries.  For example, nonlawyers can represent claimants 
before the U.S. Social Security Administration and recover a fee if they 
pass an examination and meet other requirements.153  Licensed workers’ 
compensation representatives can represent claimants in some states if they 
meet certain requirements, including passing an examination.154  
Independent paralegals in Ontario, who must pass a licensing examination, 
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can provide representation in small claims court and traffic court, and 
before the Landlord and Tenant Board.155  Qualified nonlawyers in the 
United Kingdom can represent individuals in immigration proceedings.156 
The determination of when NLRs should be permitted to provide advice 
and representation to clients should focus on the procedural complexity of 
the forum, the substantive complexity of the law, and the likelihood of 
consumer confusion.  Thus, trained NLRs should be permitted to represent 
individuals in courts of limited procedural complexity such as small claims 
courts.  The experiences in Canada and the United Kingdom suggest that 
NLRs might also be licensed to represent individuals with respect to 
somewhat more complex matters, such as landlord-tenant cases.  The 
wisdom of doing so would depend upon the complexity of the law and 
procedures in the forum.  At the same time, even though the United States 
permits nonlawyer accredited representatives to represent clients in 
immigration proceedings,157 this approach deserves careful scrutiny.  
Immigration law is complex and immigrants often have difficulty 
understanding the differences between lawyers and nonlawyer providers of 
legal services.158  Accredited representatives, who can appear in 
proceedings on behalf of immigrants, are not required to take an 
examination or undergo any particular training.159  Unless NLRs can be 
trained to provide competent representation in immigration proceedings, 
and the different capabilities of lawyers and NLRs can be effectively 
communicated to clients, nonlawyers should not be permitted to represent 
clients in immigration matters unless they are supervised by a lawyer. 
The introduction of more NLRs into the market for legal services has 
associated costs, including the cost of regulation.  In Washington, after an 
infusion of over $220,000 from the Washington State Bar Association, the 
cost of LLLT regulation is expected to be paid entirely through LLLT 
certification and examination fees.160  NLRs should not, however, bear the 
full cost of regulation if NLRs are then forced to charge rates that 
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individuals cannot afford.  Some state funding may be needed, just as it is 
needed for the administration of many state lawyer discipline systems.161 
One other important cost that is not yet known is the rates that NLRs will 
charge their clients.  Theoretically, NLRs’ rates should be somewhat lower 
than lawyers’ rates because NLRs do not incur the substantial cost (and 
debt) associated with three years of law school.  Moreover, if NLRs are 
licensed only to work in a single area (e.g., family law), the limited scope of 
the work should make it easier to organize their work efficiently and 
provide it in a cost-effective manner.  Nevertheless, NLRs would incur 
many of the same ongoing expenses incurred by lawyers including office 
space, computers, telephones, certification costs, and continuing legal 
education.  They may also incur some expenses—such as malpractice 
insurance—that some other lawyers will not incur.162  Even if the entry of 
NLRs into the legal services market forces the rates charged for certain 
legal services downward, it remains to be seen whether those rates will be 
affordable for low-income Americans. 
If the entry of NLRs into the market for legal services causes the rates for 
certain legal services to fall, this may represent the type of disruptive 
innovation that will have significant market consequences.163  Disruptive 
innovation occurs when the innovation targets new consumers or targets 
existing consumers in ways that are not of interest to the market 
incumbents.164  NLRs may create new consumers of legal services who 
could not previously afford to pay for legal representation.165  At the same 
time, they may drive lawyers out of less remunerative practice areas.166  At 
a minimum, it seems likely that NLR entry into other areas will mean that 
some lawyers will leave the field (or choose not to enter it) because it has 
become less profitable.  As the Washington Supreme Court noted, however, 
when it decided to allow LLLTs to provide advice in the area of family law, 
“[p]rotecting the monopoly status of attorneys in any practice area is not a 
legitimate objective.”167 
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CONCLUSION 
The legal profession has been remarkably effective in maintaining 
control over the legal services market, notwithstanding the lack of evidence 
that lawyers are more effective or ethical than trained and licensed 
nonlawyers in certain legal contexts.  Research suggests that “[t]he control 
on entry into legal practice, years of legal education, and regulation of 
conduct and competence have done little or nothing to distinguish lawyers 
from their nonlawyer competitors.”168  Nevertheless, it is important to 
proceed cautiously when opening up legal services markets to NLRs.  Some 
areas may not be appropriate for nonlawyer representation because of their 
procedural or substantive complexity or the possibility of consumer 
confusion. 
The legal profession needs to decide what role to play in this market 
transition.  The elite bar has been open to efforts to allow nonlawyers to 
provide more legal services to individuals,169 in part because nonlawyers 
will not compete with them for high-end corporate work.  Much of the rest 
of the organized bar has attempted to block efforts to expand entry of 
nonlawyer providers into the legal services market.170  While the bar can 
continue to obstruct the opening of the legal market to NLRs, and may 
continue to win some battles, it will eventually lose the war.  In order to 
prepare for the changes in the legal services market, the bar should instead 
consider how to make the delivery of legal services more accessible and 
cost-effective for consumers.  The legal profession could also have a role 
shaping, in constructive ways, the future training and responsibilities of 
NLRs.  If the bar attempts to cling to its monopoly, and does not engage 
with these changes, those issues are likely to be resolved by courts, 
legislatures, and the marketplace in ways that do not consider lawyers’ 
legitimate interests and concerns. 
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